论个人信息人格利益的隐私本质
法制与社会发展[ISSN:1006-6128/CN:22-1243/D]
卷:
期数:
2019年04期
页码:
99-120
栏目:
部门法哲学研究
出版日期:
2019-07-10
- Keywords:
- Personal Information; Social Attribute; Privacy Disclosure; Relative Standard; Dynamic Mode
- 摘要:
- 个人信息人格利益独立权说和传统隐私权说以信息控制理论、知情同意规则为基础，奉行隐私公开的绝对标准。一般人格权说虽认识到信息社会下隐私共享不可避免，但无暇反思隐私公开的绝对标准。在大数据时代，除表征功能外，个人信息人格利益仍应归入隐私范畴，只是因其无法被控制、必须共享而具有社会属性。而隐私概念在其诞生之初，就存在家庭、朋友、同事等关系维度。隐私信息无法事先界定，只能进行动态判断，这为隐私信息商业利用提供了合法性基础，并催生了基于场景理念的隐私判断模式。隐私公开的绝对标准是对隐私概念的误读，信息社会尤其呼唤以关系为视角的隐私公开的相对标准。“民法典各分编（草案）·人格权编”应顺应时势作出修改。
- Abstract:
- The theory that personality interest under personal information is independent right, and the theory that traditional privacy right contains personal information, are based on information control theories and informed consent rules, and adhere to the absolute standard of privacy disclosure. Although it is recognized that privacy sharing is inevitable under the information society, the theory of personal information protected by general personality right have no time to reflect the absolute theory of privacy disclosure. In age of big data, in addition to the function of characterization, the personality interest under personal information should still fall into the category of privacy, but also has some social attributes because the interest cant be controlled and must be shared, and there are family, friends, colleagues and other relationship dimensions at the beginning of the concept of privacy. Privacy information cant be defined in advance, only be dynamic judgment, which also provides the legitimate basis for the commercial use of private information, and give birth to the idea of privacy judgment based on the context. The absolute theory of privacy disclosure is the misreading of the concept of privacy, and the information society especially calls for the relative standard from the perspective of relationship. The Personality Right part in China Civil Code (draft) should be modified in accordance with the times.
相似文献/References:
[1]王燃.大数据时代侦查模式的变革及其法律问题研究[J].法制与社会发展,2018,(05):110.
备注/Memo
*房绍坤，吉林大学法学院教授、博士生导师，吉林大学财产法研究中心主任，教育部“长江学者奖励计划”特聘教授；曹相见，山东农业大学泰山法治研究院副教授。
本文的主题、基本立场、论证、修改由房绍坤提出和完成，收集整理文献、撰写全文初稿和文字校对由曹相见完成。
本文系国家社会科学基金青年项目“人格权确权的伦理基础研究”（17CFX026）的阶段性成果。
更新日期/Last Update:
2019-07-10